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Struktur Lembaga sebagai Proxi Isyarat Kualiti IPO:  
Kajian atas Firma Bursa Malaysia Papan Kedua 
ABSTRAK 
 
 
     Fenomena terkurang harga sejak dahulu lagi menambak perhatian para akademik dalam 
usaha mereka untuk merasionalkan kejadian anomali ini. Kajian mengenai hubungan antara 
tadbir urus korporat dan prestasi firma juga sering di kaji. Certo, Daily dan Dalton (2001) 
ialah para akademik pertama yang mengabungkan kedua bidang ini dengan melihat pada 
struktur lembaga sebagai proksi isyarat kualiti firma pada masa Tawaran Awam 
Permulaan.(IPO). Sekata dengan teori isyarat, keputusan kajian mereka mendapati saiz 
lembaga dan reputasi lembaga mempunyai korelasi negatif dengan terkurang harga; tetapi 
komposisi lembaga dan struktur kepimpinan lembaga tidak mempunyai korelasi negatif 
dengan terkurang harga. Kajian ini memperluaskan siasatan mereka kepada IPO di Bursa 
Malaysia Papan Kedua untuk mencari kesan isyarat yang ditemuai oleh mereka. Kajian ini 
menggunakan 114 sampel IPO bagi tempoh 2001 hingga 2007. Penemuan kajian mendapati 
tiada sokongan empirikal untuk menunjukkan struktur lembaga boleh memberi isyarat kualiti 
firma jesturunya mengurangkan tahap terkurang harga. Walau bagaimanapun, kajian ini 
mendapati bahawa tahap terkurang harga bagi firma di Papan Kedua untuk tahun 2001-2007 
bila diukur dengan pulangan permulaan diperlaraskan dengan nilai pasaran telah berkurangan 
dengan banyak (purata 21.37%) berbanding dengan kajian pada IPO Papan Kedua terdahulu 
(purata 101.57%) oleh How, Jelic, Saadouni dan Verheoeven (2006) bagi tempoh 1989-2000. 
Board Structure as a Signaling Proxy of IPO Quality:  
A Study on Bursa Malaysia Second Board Firms 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
          The IPO underpricing phenomenon has long fascinated academicians in the effort of 
finding the rational for the anomaly. Similarly, the relationship of corporate governance with 
firm performance is often investigated. Certo, Daily and Dalton (2001) are the first to 
combine these two areas of researches by exploring on the board structure as the signaling 
proxy for firm quality during initial public offering (IPO). Consistent with the signaling 
theory, their results show that board size and board reputation are inversely correlated with 
IPO underpricing; but board composition and board leadership structure are not inversely 
correlated with IPO underpricing. This study extends their research to Bursa Malaysia Second 
Board IPOs in an effort of finding the shown signaling effect. A total of 114 IPO sample firms 
for period of 2001 to 2007 were included in this study.  The findings however found no 
empirical support that board structure plays a role in signaling firm value thus reduces 
underpricing. However, this study found that the level of underpricing for the Second Board 
over the 2001-2007 period as measured by market adjusted initial return had reduced 
substantially (average 21.37%) as compared to earlier Second Board study (average 101.57%) 
of How, Jelic, Saadouni and Verheoeven (2006) for the period of 1989-2000. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
     An Initial Public Offerings (IPO) is the first sale of shares by a firm to the public investors. 
IPO brings benefits to the issuing firm by opening access to pool of fund for financing future 
growth at lower cost and to bring good publicity, which in essence may bring in more 
business or draw better pool of human capital. As documented in a lot of prior empirical 
studies globally, the offer price of IPO has been generally underpriced providing a positive 
abnormal initial return on the initial trading days – an initial underpricing phenomenon. This 
study will add to the existing IPO literature on initial underpricing anomaly investigating on 
the board structure role in signaling firm value which can reduce underpricing. 
 
1.2 Background of the Study 
     The act of “leaving the money on the table” by the issuing firm rather than capturing the 
full amount available when there is no underpricing puzzles the academicians. Ritter and 
Welch report that the average first-trading-day return to be 18.8% for 6,249 US IPOs between 
1980 and 2001 inclusive (cited in Varshney & Robinson, 2004, p. 56) On top of that, the level 
of initial underpricing or the “discount amount” varies over time and varies from market to 
market. As shown in Figure 1.1 below, the initial underpricing is evident in many countries.  
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Figure 1.1.  Average first-day returns on IPOs (Ritter, 2007). 
     Malaysian IPOs which are not spared from this underpricing phenomenon suffered a 
deeper level of underpricing than US IPOs. In fact, Malaysian IPOs underpricing is one of the 
highest observed. Yong (2007, p. 254) in his review of Asian IPOs mentions that the average 
initial return for Malaysian IPOs as “…Loughran et al. (1994) - 80.3% for Malaysia …. Ritter 
(2003) - 104.1% for Malaysia ….”. 
     Why does the issuing firm willing to underprice the firm rather than capturing the full 
amount should there is no underpricing? Why does underpricing vary from market to market? 
Why does underpricing changes over time? Due to these questions remain largely 
unexplained, this underpricing phenomenon continues to fascinate the academicians and 
inspires a large amount of literature in attempt of rationalizing the reason for underpricing.  
Ljungqvist (2006) generalizes the theories of underpricing documented in the IPO literature 
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into: (1) asymmetric information, (2) institutional reasons, (3) control considerations and (4) 
behavioural approaches.  
     Of these, models based on asymmetric information are very much established. Asymmetric 
information models assume one of parties involved in the issuing of IPO which consist of the 
issuing firm, the underwriter, and investors knows more than the others. The signaling theory 
advocates the firm knows better on the true intrinsic value of the firm, thus uses underpricing 
as a signaling proxy of the firm high-quality to attract investors who at this point are not 
knowledgeable on the firm. The incentive behind this act of deliberately leaving plentiful of 
money on the table is to gain lasting favourable impression among the investor community 
through a “good-choice” experience. Thereafter, the high-quality firm is able to offer 
subsequent offerings at a higher price thus enable it to recoup the earlier “loss”.  
     Signaling by underpricing is often challenged by alternative signaling proxies of firm 
quality. Advocates for the alternative signaling proxy reason that the alternative signaling 
proxy allows the firm to get similar required effect while not bearing the “loss” from 
intentionally underprice the IPO. The alternative proxies frequently used thus far are for 
example the certification effect from reputable underwriters, reputable auditors and backing 
by venture capitalist. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
     Malaysian IPOs are not spared from this underpricing phenomenon, in fact the level of 
underpricing is more severe than those observed elsewhere. Yong (2007) in his review of 
Asian IPOs mentions that the average initial return for Malaysian IPOs as “…Loughran et al. 
(1994) - 80.3% for Malaysia …. Ritter (2003) - 104.1% for Malaysia ….” (p. 254). Yong 
further documents that IPOs listed on Malaysian Second Board which consists of smaller and 
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less profitable firms generally underprice more than those in Main Board. In fact, this 
contributes to usage of listing board as a proxy for firm-quality by Taufil Mohd (2007).  
     Certo, Daily and Dalton (2001) explore on the board structure as the signaling proxy for 
firm quality during IPO, extending the earlier researches which have concentrated on studying 
the relationships of corporate governance with firm post IPO-performance. Their empirical 
result demonstrated that board size and board reputation coincide with the signaling theory 
while board independence does not.  
     After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
Malaysia is questioned. This gives rise to the establishment of the non-profit organization, 
Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) in 1998 with its mandate to raise 
awareness and practice of good corporate governance in Malaysia. Subsequently Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance in 2000 was created to serve as the guiding principles and 
best practises for corporate governance in Malaysia. As such, this study is proposed as it is 
interesting to check whether corporate governance practice for Malaysian firms can have 
similar signaling effect for the firm quality at IPO stage. 
     In particular, this study will extend Certo et al (2001) research to Malaysia with the aim to 
investigate the certification effect of the board structure in signaling firm quality to potential 
IPO investors, which helps to reduce the initial underpricing. The scope of study is limited to 
IPOs listed on the Bursa Malaysia Second Board. The Bursa Malaysia Second Board 
(previously known as KLSE Second Board) is the avenue for Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) to raise capital fund. As these firms are deemed younger and smaller and potentially 
attract more non-institutional investors due to being affordable; it is motivating to find out 
whether board structure is able to certify the firm value. 
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1.4 Research Objectives 
     This study seeks to study the certification effect of the board structure on the IPO firm 
quality which reduces initial underpricing. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
     This study attempts to answer the following questions: 
1 For younger IPO firms seeking listing in Second Board, which elements of the board 
structure are able to certify firm value which thus reduces the underpricing? 
2 Which of the existing known factors are able to explain the underpricing? 
3 Does the level of underpricing remain constant or change with time? 
 
1.6 Definition of Key Terms  
     In this study, the key terms are defined as follows: 
1 Underpricing refers to the positive abnormal market adjusted initial return frequently 
seen in an IPO. Any negative return (overpricing) will also be referred to underpricing 
unless it required to be differentiated. 
2 Board structure refers to following elements which are the independent variables for 
this study: (1) board size (2) board composition (3) board leadership (4) board 
reputation. 
3 Board size refers to the total number of members in the board of directors of the IPO 
firm. 
4 Board composition refers to the proportion of independent directors to the total number 
of members in the board of directors of the IPO firm. 
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5 Board leadership refers to separation roles of the board chairman and the highest 
executive ranking leadership. Separate board leadership essentially means the board 
chairman is not the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Group Managing Director (MD). 
6 Board reputation refers to the independent directors’ reputation as measured by total 
additional public directorships hold by the independent directors. A highly reputable 
independent director put their reputation at stake together with the other executive 
directors. Therefore, bad decision made by the team would tarnish the independent 
reputation which would then reduce the likelihood for the independent director to be 
invited to sit on other firms’ board. 
7 An independent director is a board member that has no professional or personal stake in 
the IPO firm so that the director may make sound judgement in the best interest for the 
firm, minority shareholders and other stakeholders.  
 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
     This study has contributions in the following area: 
1 Expands the existing literature on IPO research in Malaysia to study whether board 
structure signals firm quality which thus reduces underpricing. 
2 Shifts the focus to Bursa Malaysia Second Board IPOs which are less studied and where 
the results will benefit the retail investors as these IPOs are more affordable. 
3 Calculates the initial underpricing which is adjusted to market return instead of using the 
raw underpricing commonly used in Malaysian IPO literature. 
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1.8 Organization of Remaining Chapters 
     This study will focus on investigating the impact of quality and reputation of the firm’s 
board of directors towards IPO underpricing. The literature review on IPO underpricing, 
theoretical framework and the hypotheses for this study are discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 
is on the methodology and on how this study is conducted. The results of the study are found 
in Chapter 4. Finally in Chapter 5, interpretation and the implication of the results as well as 
the limitation and future direction of study are discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
     This chapter begins with a brief description of the underpricing phenomenon, showing 
evidence of initial underpricing and the various measurements of initial underpricing. This is 
followed by a literature on IPO initial underpricing based on asymmetric information models, 
in particular, the Rock’s Winner Curse and Signaling Models. The next section describes 
corporate governance focusing on those aspects that are related to this study and some other 
literature on corporate governance relating to firm performance. The Malaysian Second Board 
IPOs section covers the Malaysian underpricing phenomenon, on Second Board IPOs and 
corporate governance. This following section describes the theoretical framework on the use 
of board structure in signaling firm quality. The chapter ends with a discussion on the 
hypotheses for this study. 
 
2.2 Underpricing Phenomenon 
     Three most important anomalies are documented in the IPO literatures – (1) initial or 
short-term underpricing phenomenon, (2) “hot issue” market phenomenon and (3) the long-
run underperformance anomalies. All there aspects were subjected to rigorous research 
especially in the United States (US) (Yi, 2003; Varshney & Robinson, 2004). The level of 
initial underpricing varies over time and varies from market to market. This variation interests 
researches and inspires a number of theories to rationalize the phenomenon. Ljungqvist (2006) 
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generalizes these theories into: (1) asymmetric information, (2) institutional reasons, (3) 
control considerations and (4) behavioural approaches.  
      In the Asian markets, deeper level of initial underpricing is uncovered. Some other 
variables which are unique to Asian IPOs are studied in effort to explain the deeper level of 
underpricing observed. Meanwhile, examination on the long-run performance reveal 
overperformance which is inconsistent with the underperformance result observed in US IPOs 
(Yong, 2007).  This study will further extend the underpricing phenomenon to Malaysian 
Second Board IPOs. 
2.2.1 Measurement of Initial Underpricing 
     Initial return is most commonly measured as the percentage difference between the IPO 
offer price and the price at the end of the first trading day or listing day. This initial return 
may be positive or negative where the positive return corresponds to underpricing, a term 
frequently used in the IPO literature, while the negative return denotes the offer price is 
overpriced. The existing IPO literature on underpricing frequently use the term 
“underpricing” to denote the initial return regardless of whether it is positive or negative. 
Hence, to conform to existing literature, this study will use the term “underpricing” in place of 
initial return, ignoring its sign.  
     The measurement mentioned above is the raw underpricing which is commonly used in 
well-developed markets like US and increasingly the European markets where the market 
fluctuation between the offer price and the IPO first day closing price is typically negligible as 
the offer price is set merely hours or few days prior to trading. Similarly, underpricing may be 
measured as the price difference of aftermarket trading price and offer price multiplied by the 
number of shares available for the IPO subscription. This measurement takes into account the 
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actual monetary value resulted from underpricing the offering or generally known as “money 
left on the table”.  
     Market adjusted initial return measures underpricing as the difference between initial 
return and the market return. This measurement should be used instead of the raw 
underpricing measurement especially when studies are focused on the emerging markets 
where the offer date and listing date differs substantially. This measurement is used in 
Kiymaz (2000), Ghosh (2004) and How, Jelic, Saadouni and Verheoeven (2006) studies. 
     Another type of measurement which looks into a longer window period may be used if the 
market is limited by maximum daily volatility. For example, instead of using the listing date 
closing price; the end-of-week closing price may be used to account for the delayed 
equilibrium effect. 
     In Malaysia, the IPO is normally offered on average one month before the debut listing. 
Therefore, the measurement of the initial underpricing which is the dependent variable in this 
study is based on the market-adjusted initial underpricing to take into account the waiting 
period between offer date and the listing date. 
 
2.3 Underpricing Models - Asymmetric Information 
     The key parties involved in the IPO process are the issuing firm, the underwriters and the 
investors who purchase the IPO shares. Asymmetric information models assume that one of 
the parties has more knowledge than the others – an existence of information friction. By far, 
the most established models in IPO literature are based on asymmetric information.  
     The best description of the information friction is Rock’s Winner Curse (cited in 
Ljungqvist, 2006, p.11) which is elaborated below. The Signaling model which is the heart of 
this study is elaborated as well. However, there are other theories on asymmetric information 
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which are not discussed: (1) the information revelation theories which assume investors have 
more information that need to be elicited; and (2) principal-agent models which regard the 
underwriters have the upper hand and may create agency problem to the issuer.  
2.3.1 The Winner’s Curse 
     As cited in Ljungqvist (2006, p.11), Rock’s Winner Curse assumes that some investors 
have the upper hand in the information possession, that is, they are better informed than the 
other investors. Uniformed investors face the Winner’s Curse as they indiscriminately bid for 
the IPOs: whereby they will receive all biddings for the unattractive IPO shares. In the case of 
attractive IPOs, their bidding is partly crowded by the informed investors’ bidding. If the 
uninformed investors frequently receive overpriced IPOs and suffer losses, they will gradually 
remove themselves from IPO market. Rock assumes the IPO market requires the continuous 
participation of the uninformed investors as demand from the informed investors only is 
insufficient. Hence, to ensure that the IPO market has the participation of all investors, IPO 
firms are coerced into underpricing.  
     According to Ljungqvist (2006), the implications from this Winner’s Curse are: (1) 
adjusted for rationing, uninformed investors’ return is zero to ensure continuous participations, 
while informed investors’ earn the informed conditional return; (2) underpricing is lower if 
information is distributed more evenly among investor groups; (3) underpricing is expected to 
be higher the greater the ex ante uncertainty of firm value; (4) underwriter market share 
depends on whether or not the underwriter coerced the firm into “fair” underpricing; and (5) 
reducing information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors can reduce 
underpricing. 
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2.3.2 Signaling Model 
     In the signaling model, information asymmetry exists as it is assumed that the issuing firm 
possesses the insider information about the firm’s present risk value and the prospects for 
growth of the firm. According to the signaling theory, the firm may try various mechanisms to 
signal the firm high value, where the signal used must be: (1) obvious and be made known in 
advance which allows the investors to be timely informed and to effectively utilize the signal; 
and (2) either costly or difficult to imitate to ward of low-quality firm from imitating. 
     Allen and Faulhaber, Grinblatt and Hwang, and Welch contribute theories related to 
issuing firm deliberately underprice the IPO offer price as a signal of firm value (cited in 
Ljungqvist, 2006, p. 36). Discounting the offer price is a costly approach but it allows the 
issuing firm to return to the market with an image of a high-value firm and reap the earlier 
loss in subsequent more successful issues. Low-quality firms refrain from following the high-
quality firms as their true low-value are often revealed before the next offerings, which means 
they are not able to recoup the cost of underpricing at later issues. 
     However, using underpricing as proxy for firm high-value is challenged by alternative 
signaling proxies suggested by other studies. These other signaling proxies, if successful in 
certifying firm high-value are negatively correlated with underpricing. These proxies include 
for example, the use of reputable underwriters (e.g., Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994; Logue, 
Roglaski, Seward, & Forster-Johnson, 2002), reputable auditors (eg. Balvers, McDonald, & 
Miller, 1988; Menon & Williams, 1991), venture capitalists (Chemmanur & Loutskina, 2006; 
Megginson & Weiss, 1991), the board of directors structure (Certo et al., 2001) and the 
quality of the top management (Chemmanur & Paeglis, 2005; Hesjedal, 2007).  
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2.4 Corporate Governance 
     Corporate governance is determined by the set of relationships between a firm’s 
management, its board of directors, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance provides the structure affecting the way a firm is directed, administered or 
controlled through the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institution. This allows the 
firm to set objectives, the means of attaining the objectives and monitoring the performance; 
while the board of directors acts as the execution mechanism of corporate governance. In 
essence, corporate governance mitigate agency problem by providing proper incentives for 
the board of directors and the management of the firm to pursue objectives that are in the 
good interests of the firm, shareholders and other stakeholders while using the resources 
efficiently. 
     Of late, corporate governance regulation receives a lot of attention especially after the 
Asian Financial Crisis, and then the various high profile corporate scandals such as Enron and 
Worldcom. US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is enacted in response to the various infamous 
corporate scandals. 
     In the Malaysian context, Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) is 
established in 1998 which has the mandate to raise awareness and practice of good corporate 
governance in Malaysia. This is followed by the creation of Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance in 2000 which serves as the guiding principles and best practises for corporate 
governance in Malaysia. The code is accompanied by Bursa Malaysia listing requirement to 
disclose the firm’s extent of applying the principles and best practices in its annual reports.  
2.4.1 Board of Directors and Responsibilities 
     In most public firms, the board is composed of a chairman who is the leader of the board; 
executive directors who are the management in the firm or the insiders; independent directors 
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who are hired from outside and have no personal or professional stake in the firm; and 
sometimes non-executive directors who are not the management in the firm but have personal 
stake in the firm or are representatives from firms who have stake in the said firm.  
     These hired board members or directors are generally responsible for: (1) reviewing and 
adopting strategic plan (2) overseeing the conduct of the firm and ensuring it is properly 
managed (3) identifying risks and ensuring implementation of risk management (4) reviewing 
adequacy and integrity of the firm’s internal control system and management information 
system (5) ensuring existence of succession planning and (6) developing and implementing an 
investor relation programme for effective communication on the firm activities to the firm 
external investors (“Listing Requirement of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad”, 2006). 
     The Executive Directors are responsible for determining and implementing operational 
decisions, whilst the Non-Executive Directors complement with their skills and experiences. 
Meanwhile, the Independent Non-Executive Directors play a crucial role in ensuring that the 
strategies proposed by the management are fully deliberated and examined. In summary, the 
major role of the board of directors is to protect the shareholders’ interest; or in essence, is the 
ultimate governing body within the management structure of the publicly traded firm.  
2.4.2 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
     Corporate governance has long been a subject of study as it is believed that a well-
governed firm has better firm performance. There are many studies in the relationship 
between corporate governance variables and various firm performances such as Tobin Q, 
operating performance and shareholder payout. For example, Baysinger and Butler (1985) 
showed that there is a positive correlation between board composition and firm performance 
measured a decade after IPO. Similarly, Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein (1994) showed board 
composition has a positive relationship with market-to-book value. However, Bhagat and 
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Black (1999, 2001) do not found support for the expected positive correlation between board 
composition and firm performance. Daily and Dalton (1994) reported firm bankruptcy has 
positive relationship with board independence which is measured as interaction of board 
composition and board leadership.  
     Certo et al (2001) is the first study to use IPO underpricing as a measurement for firm 
performance and relate it to corporate governance. IPO underpricing is used as a performance 
measurement as at the stage of IPO it is the most immediate available measurement of firm 
performance. Their study is focused on the relationship between IPO performance and board 
structure which is an essential component of corporate governance that is easily observable. 
Relying on signaling theory which was elaborated in Section 2.3.2, they investigated on 
whether board structure can be used as an alternative proxy to signal firm quality. An inverse 
relationship between board structure and IPO underpricing is expected if board structure does 
signal firm quality. Details on usage of board structure in signaling firm value thus reducing 
underpricing is found in Section 2.6. 
 
2.5 Bursa Malaysia Second Board IPOs 
     In Malaysia, public firms can get listed in Bursa Malaysia on the Main Board, Second 
Board or MESDAQ. Firms seeking listing in the Main Board is subjected to very high and 
stringent entry requirements. Hence the Main Board is dominated by highly-capitalised firms 
– the “blue chips” that are attractive to foreign and institutional investments. The Second 
Board is a secondary market created in November 1988 with the objective to provide an 
avenue for SMEs to raise capital funds. This indirectly allows wealth accumulation among the 
Malaysian public as they are able to invest in these firms at cheaper prices compared to pricey 
“blue chips” firms. The MESDAQ Board which started operation in 2002 is to essentially 
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create a fund-raising market for technology firms or high-growth firms with little or no track 
record (U.S. PECC FMD Committee, 2001). 
2.5.1 Literature on Factors Influencing Underpricing 
     The literature on Malaysian IPOs is not as excessive as the literature done for US IPOs. 
This provides a lot of opportunities to test the various theories which have been empirically 
tested using US IPOs. Nevertheless, the Malaysian IPO literature documents some IPO 
underpricing factors which are unique to Malaysian IPOs.  
     The implication of Rock’s Winner Curse model where higher underpricing is expected to 
compensate for the firm risk is supported by US IPOs. Using firm age as the proxy for the 
risk; Hiau Abdullah and Taufil Mohd (2004) and Jelic, Saadouni and Briston (2001) do not 
find evidence supporting the positive relationship between underpricing and risk for 
Malaysian IPOs. Similarly, How et al. (2006) using firm age and growth option as proxy for 
risk do not find a conclusive positive relationship between risk and underpricing.  
     Larger firms are able to bear the cost of underpricing will be able to underprice more in 
accordance to the signaling model. Studies on Malaysian IPOs find support for this 
relationship (Hiau Abdullah & Taufil Modh, 2004; Wan-Hussin, 2005, 2006). However, 
Yong and Isa find that Second Board IPOs which are smaller in size than IPOs listed in Main 
Board have relatively a higher level of underpricing (cited in Yong, 2007, p. 260).  
     According to signaling theory, underwriter reputation can signal firm high-value thus 
reducing underpricing. However, contradicting the results shown in US IPOs, Jelic et al. 
(2001) found that prestigious underwriter on average underprices the share.   
     Subscription rate or demand highly influence the level of underpricing as found by Yong 
and Isa (cited in Yong, 2007, p. 260) and Wan-Hussin (2006, 2005). High demand reflects 
high level of interest of investors to obtain the IPO shares thus leading to the belief of firm 
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high value. This creates market sentiment to bid up the IPO trading price or “hot issue” 
causing higher underpricing. 
     Wan-Hussin (2006, 2005) finds that the existence of share moratorium or share lockup is a 
determinant of underpricing level. Bursa Malaysia regulates a share moratorium on most of 
the IPO firms, requiring a 45% lockup of the outstanding shares belonging to the substantial 
shareholders’ shares within one year of listing. Thereafter, these shares maybe liquidated on a 
straight-line basis over a 3-year period. This share moratorium regulation replaces the IPO 
profit guarantee scheme. Both schemes serve the same purpose of protecting the shareholders 
investment and have a positive association with underpricing. In fact, his study shows that the 
greater the level of directors’ shares subjected to lockup, the higher the level of underpricing. 
This also implies that the level of retained ownerships is highly correlated to underpricing. 
     Using 70 IPOs listed in Malaysia between 1991 and 1998, Hiau Abdullah and Taufil Mohd. 
(2004) explore on another regulator intervention which is the indigenous or “bumiputera” 
population share allocation. As a mechanism to redistribute wealth, the Malaysian 
government requires at least 30% indigenous population ownership for firms seeking listing. 
Their empirical result supports the positive relationship between the indigenous ownership 
and underpricing. Their underpricing model uses firm size, number of shares held by 
substantial shareholders after IPO, indigenous population ownership, and substantial 
shareholder’s loss due to offering their pre-IPO shares as explanatory variables.  
2.5.1 Corporate Governance and Second Board 
     As part of the effort to raise awareness and practice of good corporate governance in 
Malaysia, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2000 was applied to Malaysian firms 
using a hybrid of perspective approach and non-perspective approach. The Code consists of 
broad principles which allow for flexibility in applications, by factoring in circumstances and 
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common sense. The non-perspective approach regulates of the extent of practices to be 
disclosed in the annual reports of public firms. The principles and best practices stated in the 
Code cover areas of the Board of Directors; Directors’ remuneration; Shareholders; and 
Accountability and Audit. 
     Although the Code serves as guiding principles and best practices, some of them are made 
mandatory as part of the listing requirement under Chapter 15: Corporate Governance. For 
example, Bursa Malaysia requires a Board to have independent directors, the number of 
whom must be higher than 2 or 1/3 of the total board members. A director may only hold up 
to 10 directorships in listed firms and 15 directorships in other firms. (“Listing Requirement 
of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad”, 2006) 
     Second Board IPOs are the focus of this study. According to the Bursa listing requirement, 
firms seeking listing in the Second Board must have an issued and paid up capital of at least 
RM 40 million with an operating history of at least five full financial years. Within the 
operating period, the firm needs to demonstrate an uninterrupted profit record of 3 to 5 years, 
with an aggregate after-tax profit of RM 12 million, of which, the most recent year must have 
a profit of RM 4 million. (“Listing Requirement of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad”, 2006)  
     Second Board firms are relatively younger firms dominated by family-owned business 
which have smaller capital when compared to their “blue chips” counterparts on the Main 
Board. They are also subjected to less restrictive listing requirements and are yet to build 
reputation among the investors. All these give the perception of “lower quality” and are then 
less attractive to institutional investors.  
     The insiders or top executives are the main contributors for the firm success enabling the 
firms to fulfil the listing requirements. As such, high asymmetric information between 
insiders and investors is expected for the Second Board IPOs. Therefore, these firms provide a 
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fertile ground for testing theories based on asymmetric information specifically signaling 
theory which assumes the issuing firms or insiders know better on the firm. However, using 
underpricing as signaling proxy is not cost effective for these small-capital firms. This allows 
investigation using alternative signaling mechanism such as board structure.  
 
2.6 Theoretical Framework  
          This study is inspired by the work by Certo et al. (2001) which examines board 
structure as a signal for firm high value thus reducing underpricing. Essentially, this study 
extends their study to Malaysian IPOs on Bursa Malaysia Second Board.  
     As noted by Certo et al. (2001), using board structure as the proxy in signaling firm quality 
fulfils the criteria for a signaling proxy mentioned earlier which are (1) obvious/earlier known 
and (2) costly/difficult to impersonate. The first criterion is fulfilled as the information of the 
board of directors is readily available from the IPO prospectus where there is a section 
detailing the directors’ profile. The IPO prospectus is an essential document to the listing 
process and acts as the key source of information for investors. The second criteria is fulfilled 
as independent directors who put their reputation on the line will be hesitant to be involved in 
any decision that would jeopardize their reputation, that is joining a low-quality Board. Hence, 
low-quality firms would not be able to get prestigious independent directors on the Board.  
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Figure 2.2. Theoretical framework. 
    The theoretical framework shown in the diagram above follows the study by Certo et al. 
(2001). The independent variables and the hypotheses relating them to underpricing are 
elaborated in the following section. 
2.7 Hypotheses 
     This section covers the independent variables and the associated hypotheses in the 
theoretical framework mentioned in the earlier section. 
2.7.1 Board Size 
     Board size is the total number of members sitting on the board. As cited in Certo et al. 
(2001, pg. 38), there is no agreement in existing literature on a “good” size is. Some studies 
for example, Yermack say large is better but some say less is better for example Alexander, 
Fennel and Halpern; and Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand. Advocates of larger board size 
argue that smaller firms will benefit more with larger board size as it represents the possibility 
of accessing to a wider range of external resources important to the firm. The Malaysian Code 
of Corporate Governance does not state a size or size range but requires the firm to evaluate 
the size based on the impact to effectiveness. 
Board Structure 
Underpricing 
Independent Variables 
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Board Composition 
Board Size 
 
Board Leadership 
Board Reputation 
 
 
 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
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     Following Certo et al (2001) which relies on the argument that at the stage of IPO, greater 
access to external resources is crucial, it is hypothesize that: 
H1: Board size will be negatively related to underpricing 
     They found support for this hypothesis from their empirical result. 
2.7.2 Board Independence 
     Board independence reflects how autonomous the board may function as the corporate 
governance body in relation to management ranks decisions for the firm. As noted by 
Filatotchev and Bishop (2002, pg. 945), corporate governance literature frequently measures 
board independence as the proportion of independent directors or board composition and 
board leadership structure.  
     The Bursa Malaysia listing requirement defines independent director as someone “… who 
is independent of management and free from any business or other relationship which could 
interfere with the exercise of independent judgement or the ability to act in the best interests 
of an applicant or a listed issuer …” in section 1.01. Furthermore, it requires a board 
composition of at least of 2 independent directors or 1/3 of the board size to consist of 
independent directors. (“Listing Requirement of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad”, 2006). 
As for board leadership structure, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance does not 
encourage combining the role of the board Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and 
requires public disclosure explaining the decision if the roles are combined. (“Malaysian Code 
on Corporate Governance March 2000”, 2000) 
     A more independent board encourages effectiveness leading to better governance due to no 
dominance of the executive directors, and a well-governed firm leads to better performance. 
Earlier literature however did not find conclusive support. Those that supported the argument 
are for example, Baysinger and Butler (1985) which shows that there is a positive correlation 
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of board composition with firm long run performance measured by a decade after inception. 
Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein (1994) study reveals similar correlation when using market-to-
book value as firm performance measurement. Daily and Dalton (1994) study on firm 
bankruptcy finds support for positive relation with board independence measured as 
interaction of board composition and board leadership. However, a later study by Bhagat and 
Black (1999, 2001) does not support the positive correlation of board composition and firm 
performance.  
     Certo et al. (2001) study the relationship of board independence with firm performance at 
IPO stage. They measure board independence in two separate variables which are board 
composition and board leadership. Their study which relies on signaling theory predicts both 
variables to have an inverse relationship with underpricing. The hypotheses which follow 
Certo et al (2001) study will be tested: 
H2: Independent directors will be negatively associated to underpricing 
H3: Separate board leadership will be negatively related to underpricing 
     However, it is noted that Certo et al (2001) result shows that the higher number of 
independent directors, the greater the level of IPO underpricing which rejects hypothesis H2. 
They also do not find support for hypothesis H3. They explain that this reflects underwriters’ 
belief that growth-oriented firms are better served by insider directors who are more familiar 
with the firm than outside independent directors. 
2.7.3 Board Reputation 
     Reputation plays an important role in the corporate world because good reputation works 
like a charm to influence favourable decisions, whether it is for investment, career or product 
choices. This is especially true if the decision has to be made in an environment where 
information is scarce and the uncertainty of return is high. In fact, the IPO underpricing 
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literature on asymmetric information has suggested using reputation as signaling mechanism 
of firm value, for example, using reputable underwriter and reputable auditor. 
     Recognizing the importance of reputation, people or firms alike work hard to establish 
their reputation. Independent directors build their reputation by enriching their skills, gaining 
invaluable experience and building connectivity. These reputable independent directors are 
highly sought after, especially by firms wishing to “rent” their reputation to signal the firm 
value. However, reputation is fragile as it takes a lot of effort to build it but takes very little to 
tarnish it. Any bad decision that the board make will easily tarnish the hard-earned reputation 
of independent directors causing them to be careful in selecting which board to sit in. 
     Relying on signaling theory, Certo et al. (2001) found evidence that existence of reputable 
independent directors measured by number of additional directorships held by the 
independent director is able reduce the asymmetric information thus reduces underpricing. 
Following Certo et al. (2001), it is hypothesized that: 
H4a: Board reputation will be negatively related to underpricing 
      Based on earlier literature such as Shivdasam, and Cohen and Cohen (cited in Certo et al., 
2001, p. 38), Certo et al. (2001) investigated on existence of a non-linear relationship between 
board reputation and IPO underpricing. This hypothesis relates to the argument that beyond a 
certain threshold, additional directorships jeopardize the effectiveness of the director. In other 
words, board reputation will reduce underpricing but at a decreasing rate. Therefore, this non-
linear relationship was measured as squared value of additional directorships held by the 
independent director. Consistent with H4a, the non-linear relationship is expected to have 
inverse relationship with underpricing. However, the non-linear relationship expected is not 
apparent in their empirical result.  
H4b: Board reputation relationship with underpricing will be non-linear 
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     Bursa listing requirement on corporate governance seems to agree with the effectiveness 
argument on number of directorships. As part of the listing requirement, a limit of 25 
directorships that a director may hold at any one time is set, 10 of which can be for listed 
firms. (“Listing Requirement of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad”, 2006) 
  
2.8 Summary 
     This study is a first attempt to examine the impact of corporate governance on IPO initial 
performance. As the study is focused on Malaysian Second Board IPOs, the results from this 
study will benefit retail investors in their investment decisions. 
